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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern debate on Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) deposit insurance reform was initially precipitated by
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of bank regulation and the
wave of bank failures in the 1980s.' In the late 1990s, however, the
booming economy and favorable banking conditions put
discussion of deposit insurance reform on the back burner. Then,
in late summer 2001, Superior Bank of Hinsdale, Illinois collapsed,
reviving Capitol Hill interest in overhauling the FDIC deposit
insurance system. "Superior's failure was a warning that even
when the insurance funds are healthy, trouble lurks just around the
corner."3 The failure of Superior Bank was not an isolated event;
since 1998 the FDIC has lost over one billion dollars due to bank
failures that share similarities with Superior These similarities
include poor bank management and internal controls, faulty
accounting opinions, and a high percentage of sub-prime loans in
the banks' asset portfolios.' Although Superior focused attention
on this issue, the FDIC has been arguing for years that troubled
1. George Hanc, Deposit Insurance Refornm State of the Debate, 12 FDIC
BANIUNG RExy. 1, 1 (1999), available at http:llwv.Tw.fdie.govibanklanalyticallbanldngl
1999dec11_y2n3.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). At the time the article was
published, George Hanc was Associate Director for the Div. of Research and
Statistics at the FDIC. Id.
2. Mike McNamee, One Bank Down. Thne to Bolster the FDIC?, BUS. W,
Sept. 3,2001, at 45.
3. Id.
4. John Reich, FED. DEPosrr INS CORP., THE LESSONS OF SUPERIOR, (Aug. 21,
2001), at 1, at http:lI,,-v.fdi.govlnewvsfnewvs-peechesfchairmanrsp2.augOl.html
(last updated Aug. 28, 2001). Between January 1 and February 7, 2002, four
FDIC-insured banks failed. Richard Cowden, Bank Failures: OC Closes Internet-
Only Nextbanl, Marking 4- Failure in 2002, Banling Daily (BNA), Feb. S. 2002. The
second 2002 bank failure will result in a $1.4 million charge to the BIF. R. Christian
Bruce, Financial Institutions: FDIC Takes Over Failed Tewas Bank; Shutdow.n Marks
Second Failure in 2002, Banldng Daily (BNA), Jan. 23, 2002.
5. d.
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institutions with several volatile factors were increasing the risk to
the deposit insurance funds.6
This Note examines identified problems with the current
FDIC system, focusing specifically on deposit insurance coverage
limits, and reviews and evaluates various proposed solutions. It
begins with a brief history of deposit insurance and an overview of
the statutory basis for the current system.' The Note then
discusses some of the perceived system flaws, considers whether
the system needs reform, and debates whether the timing for
reform is now appropriate. 8 Next, the Note reviews several reform
proposals: the five-part 2001 reform proposal package published
under the former FDIC leadership of Donna Tanoue;9 current
Chairman Donald Powell's comments on the 2001 proposal, along
with his additional recommendations regarding increasing deposit
insurance; ° and current legislative activity on this topic." The
Note follows with an analysis of diverging viewpoints on one
provision of the proposal-increasing and/or indexing the deposit
insurance coverage level. 12 Finally, the Note concludes with a
summary review of the balancing issues legislators must consider
when evaluating the various proposals. 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History
For over sixty years, the United States' deposit insurance
system has been the cornerstone on which American consumer
confidence in its banking and financial systems rests, 4 and a world-
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 14-42 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 43-85 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 99-1110 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 111-124 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 125-187 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
14. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., KEEPING THE PROMISE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM, at i (Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter KEEPING
THE PROMISE], available at http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/initiative/
direcommendations.PDF (last visited Feb. 2,2002).
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wide model.15 The insurance system arose to address a series of
actual and threatened bank runs and ensuing bank failures across
the nation, as well as the public's distrust of the U.S. banking
system.16 In response, the U.S. Congress passed the Banking Act
of 1933, which provided for a temporary plan of federal deposit
insurance and established the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).17 The program's primary purpose was to
ensure the continued stability of the monetary system, but related
purposes included protecting the small depositor'2 and supporting
a predominantly unit banking system.Y The initial insurance
coverage level, set temporarily at $2,500, was adopted in January
of 193420 but was subsequently increased to $5,000 a year later and
maintained at that level when the program became permanent in
1935.21
15. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER § I (Aug.
2000) [hereinafter DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER], available at http:lwv,%v,,2.
fdic.goviEPClDIDII.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). The Deposit Insurance
Options Paper documents the FDIC's comprehensive review of the U.S. deposit
insurance system, and was produced in collaboration with the risk-management
consulting firm of Oliver, Wyman & Co. Id.
16. Christine M. Bradley, A Historical Perspective on Deposit Insurance
Coverage, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 1-4 (Dcc. 2000), avadable at http:I1vw%,-w.fdic.
govlbankfanalvticalbanldng2000decbrvl3n21.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,2002).
17. Id. at 4-5; see Banking Act of 1933 (The Glass Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 66,
§ 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 16S (1933) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835(a) (2000)); see
also Hanc, supra note 1, at 2-3: LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 44 (2001).
18. Bradley, supra note 16, at 5. Contra, Alan S. Blinder & Robert F. Wescott,
Reform Qf Deposit Insurance-A Report to the FDIC (Mar. 20, 2001), at
http'lwv.wv.fdic.govldepositinsurancelinitiafivetreform.html (last updated Apr. 30,
2001). Blinder and Westcott argue that protecting the small depositor is only an
"incidental benefit," and not the main purpose, of deposit insurance, stating that the
U.S. government should maintain deposit insurance most importantly to enhance
macroeconomic and financial stability. Id. The small depositor is protected through
the government's guarantee that the depr ,itor vil receive back the amount of his
deposit (up to the insured amount) in the event of bank failure. BROOME &
MIARKHA., supra note 17, at 463.
19. Hanc, supra note 1, at 2.
20. Bradley, supra note 16, at 6; see Banking Act of 1933 (The Glass Steagall
Act), Pub. L. No. 66, § 12B(y), 48 Stat. 162, 179 (1933).
21. Bradley, supra note 16, at 10; see also Pub. L. No. 305, § 12B(c)(13), 49 Stat.
6S4, 686 (1935); Hanc, supra note 1, at 2. The Banking Act of 1935 converted the
FDIC from a temporary to a permanent agency. BROOME & MARNHVA, supra note
17, at 44.
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The newly elected president, Franklin Roosevelt, opposed
government guarantees of bank deposits and nearly vetoed the
legislation, claiming that "insurance covering all banks would
protect improvident operators from the consequences of their own
folly." 22  The American Bankers Association concurred,
maintaining that such insurance would reward ineptness in
banking practices.23 However, public opinion regarding the dire
condition of the nation's banking system forced Congressional
action.'
Since 1935, Congress has approved several non-systematic
increases to deposit insurance's coverage limit, with the last
increase in 1980 bringing the maximum coverage from $40,000 to
$100,000 per institution per ownership type.' Increasing the
coverage limit again is currently among several FDIC reform
proposals that the legislature, government entities such as the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, and various banking
trade associations are debating.
B. Current System-Statutory Basis and Recent Legislation
Legislative acts passed within the past twenty-five years
provide the statutory basis for how the federal deposit insurance
system operates today. A series of external forces, including the
dramatic increase in world oil prices, drove inflation rates to
record levels, peaking at a prime rate of above twenty percent in
22. Notes: FDIC's Lifesaver, THE BANKER, Nov. 1, 1990; see also Bradley, supra
note 16, at 5.
23. Bradley, supra note 16, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Hanc, supra note 1, at 3. The FDIC calculates deposit insurance coverage
based on the types of ownership in which the funds are held. FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., EDIE (ELECTRONIC DEPOSIT INS. ESTIMATOR)-ARE My FUNDS
ADEQUATELY INSURED?, at http://www2.fdic.gov/edie/cHelpLinksLO3asp (last
updated Nov. 8, 2000). Funds held in different types of ownership, such as individual,
joint, retirement, etc. are separately insured. Id. Thus, it is possible for an individual
to have funds exceeding $100,000 in the same institution and be fully insured. Id.;
see also 12 C.F.R. § 330.3 (2001). Deposit insurance coverage is based on ownership
rights and capacities (i.e., for the benefits of a particular depositor or depositors) in
which the deposit accounts are maintained at insured depository institutions. Id. All
deposits in a particular institution, maintained in the same right and capacity, are
added together and insured in accordance with the regulations determining the
coverage limit. Id.
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the early 1980s.1 6  Interest rate ceilings and restrictions then
imposed on banks prevented them from competing for new or
existing deposits with savings vehicles such as money market
mutual funds, which were not so restricted. 7 These factors,
coupled with prior unprecedented economic expansion, high
interest-rate volatility, low personal savings rates and unstable
deposit flows,' resulted in "disintermediation," driving the
banking industry into crisis. 9  Savings institutions, stuck with
portfolios of long-term mortgages at low interest rates, were thus
additionally challenged to fund these mortgages! '
Against this economic background, Congress passed
legislation that implemented vwde-ranging changes to the nation's
monetary system by deregulating interest rates, authorizing
interest payment on negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts, and requiring all depository institutions to comply vith
certain Federal Reserve requirements." It was also at this time
that Congress instituted the most recent increase in deposit
insurance coverage, from $40,000 to the current level of $100,000. "
The savings and loan crisis in the 1980s precipitated
Congress's legislative enactment of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to
increase the FDIC's supervisory authority to reform the deposit
insurance system.3 This act, among other things, abolished the
26. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANmIIG LAw AND
REGULATION, at 30 (2d ed. 1997).
27. Id. The Banking Act of 1933 prohibited banks from pa ing interest on
checking accounts, and the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Q limited the
interest rates that banks and thrifts could pay on time and savings accounts. Id.
Regulation Q capped interest rates for banks at 5!'4% and for thrifts at 5% (in order
to assist thrifts in attracting deposits for home mortgage lending); conversely, money
market mutual funds were paying the fourteen to fifteen percent Treasury bill rates.
BROOmE & MARNA-xM, supra note 17, at 102.
28. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 17.
29. M-CEY & MILLER, supra note 26, at 30-31. "Disintermediation" refers to the
phenomenon whereby customers vdthdraw their funds from banks and invest them
elsewhere. Id at 31.
30. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 17-18.
3L Id. at 18; see also Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 (DIDMCA or Monetary Control Act). Pub. L. No. 96-21 94 Stat. 132-
141 (19S0).
32. Bradley, supra note 16, at 17.
33. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (19S9) (codified as amended
20021 433
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Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which
provided insurance for most of the nation's savings banks and
savings and loans,34 and subsequently created two new federal
deposit insurance systems: the Savings Association Insurance Fund
(SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) 5
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) directed the FDIC to implement a risk-
based system of deposit insurance premiums, and required that
each fund maintain its ratio of reserves to insured deposits at a
designated reserve ratio (DRR) of 1.25%.36 If the actual ratio of
either of the funds falls below the DRR, by statute, the FDIC must
charge or raise premiums to the institutions insured by that fund
by enough to bring the ratio back to the DRR within one year,37 or
it must charge premiums of at least twenty-three basis points until
the DRR is met.38
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)).
34. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 26, at 67-68.
35. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 211, (5), (6), 103 Stat. 183, 219 (1989)
(codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)). All national banks, most state-
chartered commercial banks, and a small number of thrifts are insured through the
BIF; savings banks and savings and loans are primarily insured through the SAI.
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 26, at 67. The BIF and SAIF funds were "originally
intended to insure bank and savings association deposits separately," however, today
both funds insure deposits at both banks and savings associations, and banks and
savings associations often hold both types of deposits (those insured by BIF and
SAIF). KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 2. Although both funds provide the
same insurance coverage and operate under the same statutory assessment system,
the assessment rates for the two funds are set separately, raising the possibility of
institutions with similar risk characteristics paying different premiums. Id. at 2 & 4.
36. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA),
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 302 (b)(1), 105 Stat. 2345 (1991) (codified as amended in 12
U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000)) as cited in KEEPING THE PROMISE,
supra note 14, at 2. The FDIC places insured institutions into risk categories by
utilizing a nine-cell, two-dimensional matrix based on capital levels (1, 2, 3) and
supervisory ratings (A, B, C). Id. at 2. The capital ratios are based on leverage ratios
and risk-based capital ratios; the supervisory ratings are based on each bank's
composite CAMELS rating (an acronym for Capital, Asset quality, Management,
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk) which is assigned by bank
examiners. Id at 2 and n.4. 1A is the highest composite rating. Id. at 2. Although
FDICIA directed the FDIC to adopt risk-based pricing, the law prohibits it from
distinguishing among institutions that pose significant variations in risk exposure if
they fall within the same risk category. Id at 4.
37. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA),
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 104 (a)(C)(ii), 105 Stat. 2238-2239 (1991) (codified as amended
in 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2000)).
38. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 2 n.3.
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The Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 (DIFA), a more
recent act, prohibits the FDIC from charging any premiums to
well-capitalized institutions as long as the funds' reserve ratio
exceeds the DRR.39 Because both the BIF and SAIF ratios have
remained well above the DRR, most BIF institutions have not
paid any premiums since 1995, the year in which the BIF insurance
funds were recapitalized; members of SAIF that are rated 1A have
paid no premiums since 1997.40 Thus, de novo institutions - 844
new banks and thrifts - have never paid any premiums and are
often perceived as free-loaders4 1
Illustrating a relatively recent phenomenon, brokerage
institutions, such as Merrill Lynch and Salomon Smith Barney, are
shifting billions of dollars from uninsured accounts into FDIC
insured accounts at affiliated banks that have never paid any
deposit insurance premiums, further diluting the DRR and
directing additional attention to the free-rider problem. -
39. Id. at 3. The Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 (DIFA). Pub. L. No. 204-
208, § 2708, 110 Stat. 3009-497 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)IA)(i)
(2.00). Nearly ninety-two percent of banks are considered vell-capitalized by virtue
of falling vithin one of the two top categories and thus currently pay no premiums.
Hearing to Examine Key Issues Related to the FDIC Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Financial Services Comm.,
107th Cong. App. A (May 16, 2001) (testimony of James E. Smith on behalf of the
Am. Bankers Assoc.) [hereinafter Testimony of James E. Smith, May 16, 20011, at
http:lwwv.aba.comiNRlrdonlresIO0003db9wmktdubwcauevcudiDI_Testimonyvjim
__Smith_051609.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,2002). The FDIC may raise the DRR for any
year in which it can document .circumstances raising a significant risk of substantial
future losses to the fund." Id.
40. DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § I, at 3.
41. Steve Cocheo, Deposit Insurance Reform: The Next Big Issue?, A.B.A.
B, LNKINo J., Oct. 1, 2000, at 6 [hereinafter Cocheo, Deposit Insurance Reform].
42. Rob Blackvell, In Focus: Solly's Sweeps Show FDIC Fund Worries Still
Apply, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 2001, at 1-2 [hereinafter Blackviell, In Focus].
Salomon has moved $32 billion from securities accounts to insured bank accounts at
Citigroup, Inc.; Merrill Lynch has shifted $47.3 billion. Id. at 3. See also comments
by Federal Reserve Board Governor, Laurence Meyer, referring to free-rider
problem caused by the movement of billions of dollars by t', o brokerage houses into
insured accounts without paying new premiums. Rob Blackvell, Treasury Joins Fed
to Back FDIC Refonn, AM. BANKER, July 27, 2001, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Blackvell.
Treasury Joins Fed].
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III. NEED FOR REFORM
The federal deposit insurance system is currently healthy
and well-funded;43  BlIF and SAIF ratios are at similar DRR
levels,' and the banking industry is well-capitalized." However,
as a result of the recent period of weak economic performance,
traditional indicators suggest that bank asset (loan) quality is
deteriorating.4 6 Community banks, in particular, saw a thirty-six
basis point drop in net interest margins in 2001 over the previous
year.47
Democrat Donna Tanoue who stepped down as chairman
of the FDIC during the summer of 2001, as well as many
lawmakers and bankers, believe the time is right to examine
perceived flaws, debate various reform proposals and enact
changes so that the system can continue serving as an "anchor for
public confidence., 48  On October 17, 2001, in his first official
appearance, FDIC Chairman Donald Powell, also voiced his
43. Testimony of James E. Smith, May 16, 2001, supra note 39, at 1. At year-end
2000, the BIF was at $32 billion and the SAIF was at nearly $11 billion dollars-a
total of over $41 billion dollars in financial resources. Id.
44. See DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § V. "As of March
31, 2000, the reserve ratio of the BIF was 1.35% and SAIF was 1.44%," which at
those levels would produce a combined fund ratio of approximately 1.38%. Id.
45. Condition of the U.S. Banking System, Presentation Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. app. (June 20,2001) (testimony
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter Greenspan,
Condition of the U.S. Banking System], http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/
testimony/2001/20010620/appendix.htm (last updated June 20, 2001). "The U.S.
banking industry is well capitalized and highly profitable by historical standards and
is in reasonably good shape ...." Id.
46. See Donald Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Opening Remarks at
a Press Conference Announcing the Release of the FDIC's Preliminary Bank
Earnings Report (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Powell, Remarks, Nov. 29, 2001],
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/archives/2001/sp29novOl.html (last
updated Nov. 29, 2001). In November 2001, troubled commercial and industrial
loans were reported to have risen dramatically in the past several years, and net
charge-offs attributed to these loans were up almost eighty-four percent from the
previous year. Id.
47. Richard Cowden, Quarterly Bank Earnings Remain Strong; Powell
Concerned About Small Institutions, 77 BANKING REP. (BNA) 355 (Sept. 10, 2001), at
355-56 [hereinafter Cowden, Quarterly Bank Earnings Remain Strong] (citing
Chairman Powell's address at his first public meeting as FDIC chairman on
September 5, 2001). Community banks, as used here, are signified as those with less
than $100 million in assets. Id.
48. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, Letter from the FDIC Chairman.
436 [Vol. 6
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strong support for reforming the deposit insurance system before
the House Financial Ser vices Committee.4
9
Tanoue believes that some provisions of the current
system, rather than protecting investors from loss of funds due to
bank failures, actually increase the likelihood of bank failure by
encouraging risk on the part of both depositors and bankers."
Additionally, external factors such as changing demographics, the
faltering economy,.1 and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, may give rise to
changing consumer savings behaviors that could alter DRR ratios,
renew the charging of bank premiums, and most likely fuel the
demand for reform.
One of the primary purposes of deposit insurance is to give
"small" depositors, which can include individuals, families, and
small businesses, a safe place to keep their savings/funds without
having to worry about the condition of the institution in which
they deposit them. 2 In order to retain the real level of the
available coverage, Congress has increased the maximum coverage
level six times since 1934, and generally the increases have kept
pace with, or exceeded, the level of inflation.s3
As mentioned previously, in 1980 the last increase occurred
within the context of a tumultuous period in banking history. '
With little debate, and occurring along with other banking reform
legislation, Congress increased deposit insurance coverage from
the 1974-set level of $40,000 to $100,000, reasoning that this
substantial coverage increase would help banks attract new
49. Adam Wasch, Powell Advises Hiqher Coverage for Retirement Savings
Accounts, 77 BANKING REP. (BNA) 627 (Oct. 22, 2001).
50. See KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, Letter from the FDIC Chairman.
51. Six in ten respondents to an FDIC survey conducted by Gallup reported that
"a stock market crash or recession would prompt them to move their money to
insured deposits." Press Release, Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., FDIC Insurance Big Factor
in Investment Decisions, Gallup Survey Show:s (May 3, 2001) [hereinafter FDIC
Insurance Big Factor], available at http:Aw.fdie.govlne,_n, ?pre,,i2 Lilt
pr3101.html (last updated May 3, 2001).
52. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14. at 17.
53. Id. at 17-18. The 19S0 increase to S100,0l10 far exceeded the necessities of
inflation and was instituted in part to help banks and thrifts retain outstanding
certificates of deposit and attract new deposits to offset outflov%,s due to interest rate
ceilings. DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § IV.
54. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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deposits." In hindsight, this disproportionate increase has been
cited as one reason for the 1980s savings and loan crisis; it
facilitated an influx of deposits into thrifts 6 creating moral
hazard-the incentive for insured banks to engage in riskier
behavior than they would have had they been uninsured." The
FDIC is authorized, as an ultimate enforcement measure against
this risky behavior, to bring an action to terminate an institution's
insurance if unsafe or unsound practices are discovered, however
the penalty is so severe that it is rarely used. s
Deposit insurance, additionally, creates moral hazard of a
different sort. Deposit insurance shifts the bank insolvency risk
away from depositors, who are the principal bank-debt holders,
thus removing the incentive for them to monitor their banks' risky
behaviors. 9
55. Bradley, supra note 16, at 18, (citing from STEPHEN PIZZO, MARY FRICKER &
PAUL MUOLO, INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS
(1989)).
56. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 20; see also DEPOSIT INSURANCE
OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § IV; Blinder & Wescott, supra note 18 (stating that
there existed a widely-held view that the increase in 1980 was unjustified at the time
and contributed to the savings and loan crisis); John R. Engen, The Family Feud over
Deposit Insurance, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 1997 at 69, 70 (citing Richard Kovacevic,
Chairman and CEO at Norwest Corp.) (claiming deposit insurance caused the S&L
crisis because it provided incentive for thrift management to take foolish risks,
knowing they would be bailed out).
57. Hanc, supra note 1, at 3. Moral hazard is mitigated when losses are passed on
to the insurer but profits accrue to owners. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 26, at
280-81. Thus, nearly insolvent insured banks are especially attracted to risky
investments with high potential gain, because with insurance there is only an upside
to their action. Hanc, supra note 1, at 3-4. A strong capital position will shift losses
from the insurer to the bank, which is why strong capital regulation tends to curb
moral hazard. Id. at 4. U.S. taxpayers, as the ultimate insurers, paid over $130 billion
to clean up this crisis, which followed the demise of the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the predecessor to the BIF and SAIF. DEPOSIT
INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § I. See also Fed Offers Broad Support
for Deposit Insurance Reform, BANK BAILOUT LITIGATION NEWS, Sept. 17, 2001
[hereinafter Fed Offers Broad Support] (citing Federal Reserve Board of Governor,
Laurence Meyer defining "moral hazard" as the inducement to take risks at the
expense of the insurer).
58. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 26, at 597. An order to immediately terminate
a bank's deposit insurance would trigger a run on the bank; thus, termination of
insurance is usually phased-in for current deposits, and additional deposits made
after the order are not insured. Id.
59. Id., Ch. 3 at 281. Depositors' lax attitudes about monitoring their bank's
loans have been especially prevalent in recent years due to the widespread
perception that certain banks are too big to fail, thus making deposits of any size, in
438 [Vol. 6
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Based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the real value
today of the $100,000 coverage has fallen to half of its 1980 value,
and is actually less than it was in 1974 when the level was increased
to $40,000.60 However, it is important to keep in mind that at the
time it was instituted, there was no clear rationale for the $100,000
figure.61 Some economists, espousing the free-market view,
believe the government should not provide any deposit insurance
because, as stated above, it discourages depositors from
monitoring their banks for soundness.' 2 However, one can argue
that average individual or small business depositors can hardly be
expected to have the time, inclination, or skill to evaluate the
safety of their banks.63 In a March 2001 report to the FDIC on
reform of deposit insurance, the authors maintain that depositor
monitoring would be unrealistic and inefficient, except possibly for
extremely large or sophisticated depositors."A Thus a key policy
question arises as to what constitutes a small deposit and,
accordingly, at what level should each deposit be insured."
Additionally, the authors argue that because the current limit is
based, not on the individual, but on the right and capacity' in
which an individual holds an account, investors can easily exceed
the $100,000 limit and still retain insurance on their funds. Thus
the authors urge modifying the formula for determining how
such a bank, totally guaranteed by the government. Id.
60. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 18. In 1911,0 dollars, the initial
coverage level, six increases, and current level are valued as follows: 1934 (January),
$15,373; 1934 (June), $30,746; 1950, $34,191; 1%6, $38,14S; 1969, $44,905; 1974,
$66,856; 1980, $100,000; 2000 (still at 1980 level), $43,728. Id. at I,
61. See Blinder & Wescott, supra note 18. "The current limit was pulled out of
thin air in 1980, and thus has no particular claim to optimality... .' Id.
62. Id
63. See id.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. The FDIC defines "right and capacity" as the manner in xvhich funds are
owned or held; for instance in individual, joint, trust, or retirement accounts. FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., EDIE (ELECTRONIC DEPOSIT INS. ESTIMATOR): DEPOSIT INS.
DEFINIMONS, at http:flv.wwv,2.fdic.govledielcHelpLinksLO7.asp (last updated Nov. 8,
2000).
67. Blinder & Wescott, supra note 18. To illustrate this principle, recent revisions
to FDIC regulations concerning insurance coverage for joint accounts allow coverage
up to $200,000 on joint accounts in the names of both spouses that are comprised of
community property funds separate from any funds deposited in their individual
accounts. 12 C.F.R_ § 330.9 (2001).
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deposit limits apply, so limits are imposed on the individual versus
the account type.68
The Independent Community Bankers of America
(ICBA), which promotes itself as the "primary voice for
community banks in the United States,' ' 69 points out its members'
unique challenges to competing in the marketplace for deposits
and loans. On one side, they argue they are disadvantaged in
competing with tax-exempt credit unions and the Farm Credit
System, both of which can attract funds more easily and charge
lower interest rates on loans.70 On the other side, large banks,
considered too-big-to-fail have an advantage in attracting large
deposits because depositors tend not to worry about uninsured
savings in excess of the $100,000 limit." In addition, the ICBA
argues the current deflated value of deposit insurance essentially
erodes the advantage and value of safe retirement planning and
conservative saving in bank deposit accounts by destroying the
68. Blinder & Wescott, supra note 18.
69. INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AMERICA, MISSION STATEMENT, at
http://www.ibaa.org/about_icba/ mission.html (last visited March 3, 2002).
70. INDEPENDENT COMM. BANKERS OF AMERICA, FED. DEPOSIT INS.-TIME FOR
REFORM AND INCREASED COVERAGE, ICBA SPECIAL REP. 4-5 (Fall 2000)
[hereinafter ICBA SPECIAL REP.], available at http:/www.icba.org/deposit-insurance/
depinsbrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2002). The Farm Credit System is a
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that offers deposit-like instruments to
farmers. Id. As a GSE, it enjoys tax exemptions and can raise funds more favorably
in the capital markets. Id. at 5. Credit unions also enjoy tax exempt status. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 5. The "too big to fail" doctrine refers to the systemic risk exception
which advances funds (upon a joint determination by the Secretary of the Treasury,
the President, the FDIC and the Fed) to institutions deemed "too big to fail."
Testimony of James E. Smith, May 16, 2001, supra note 39, at 14 & n.4. The result is
that technically uninsured deposits are in reality "implicitly insured," providing these
banks with an unfair competitive advantage in raising funds. Blinder & Wescott,
supra note 18. During the 1980s, bank regulators feared the possibility that imposing
losses on uninsured depositors and other creditors of large failed banks would trigger
runs on other large banks that depended on uninsured funding. Hanc, supra note 1,
at 9. "The FDICIA codified the notion that some banks are so important to the
nation's economic health that the government cannot allow them to collapse."
Engen, supra note 56, at 69, 72. The FDICIA allows the government to cover
uninsured depositors and creditors to prevent a failure that would endanger the
existing global payment systems. Id. Chairman Greenspan claims uninsured
creditors will have little reason to conduct a risk analysis on larger banking
institutions if it is understood that they will always be made whole under a de facto
"too big to fail" policy. Chairman Greenspan, Condition of the U.S. Banking System,
supra note 45. However, under the 1991 FDICIA, there are no requirements that
uninsured creditors be made whole. Id.
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trade-off between security and return, which inadvertently forces
consumers into higher risk investments. 2
All of these arguments highlight community banks' current
difficulty in sustaining their deposit base, which has historically
been their prime funding source for local lendingY Loan-to-
deposit ratio norms have shifted from the mid-seventy percent
range in the early to mid 1990s to the mid-ninety percent range
currently, with some banks now exceeding one hundred percent.:-
Congress addressed these funding concerns when it passed
the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) provisions of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, creating access to advances from home
loan banks for qualifying community financial institutions:'
Unfortunately, the costs to qualifying institutions to obtain such
advances are higher than traditional sources of funding, and
advances often contain other undesirable provisions such as
increased collateral requirements and callability.2 Thus, the three
federal banking regulators and some policy makers have
misgivings about banks becoming too dependent on FHLB,
warning that banks need to maintain their regulatory ratings in
order to retain eligibility.7
Banks can alternatively obtain funds through selling
mortgages on the secondary market. This is, however, a limited
option for community banks serving primarily rural markets since
the majority of their mortgages do not meet secondary market
underwriting requirements. 9
72. ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 70, at 12. Investments in bank time deposits
only become more attractive if they are totally sccure because in such a situation they
offer the elimination of risk at the sacrifice of greater potential yield. Id. Once
investors exceed the $100,000 limit, this security diminishes, shifting the balance. Id.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Steve Cocheo, The Search for Funding, A.B.A. BANING J., Jan. 2001, at 6.
75. ICBA SPECIAL REP, supra note 70, at 15. Qualifying banks are community
financial institutions vdth $500 million or less in assets. Id. See generally Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338-14S.1 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.). Since 19SO, FHLB advances
to thrifts have grown from 8.2% to 19.1% of liabilities. DEPOSIT LNSURANCE
OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § IV.
76. See Cocheo, The Search for Funding, supra note 74, at 6.
77. ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 70, at 15-17; see also Cocheo, The Search for
Funding, supra note 74, at 6.
78. ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 70, at 16-17.
79. Id. at 16-17.
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In its August 2000 Options Paper, the FDIC reported that
proponents of extending deposit insurance coverage for municipal
and other public deposits "argue that it would allow smaller banks
to compete more effectively for public deposits and it would
reduce administrative burdens for all insured institutions."80 The
current requirement that financial institutions pledge bank assets
for these deposits limits the amount of public funds that insured
institutions can attract.8 ' Full FDIC coverage would eliminate
these requirements since formerly secured deposits would now be
insured; thus this option could increase the possibility of moral
hazard and lead to a large rise in insured deposits, substantially
reducing the BIF and SAIF funds.82 Full coverage would also
enhance the entire banking industry's ability to attract more funds,
consequently eliminating the purported advantage to community
banks.83 A better reform option might be to continue to provide
higher coverage only for in-market municipal deposits."
Thus, deposit insurance raises a number of related issues
and requires a careful balancing of interwoven public policy
concerns.
8 5
IV. FDIC PROPOSALS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. FDIC Proposal under Chairman Tanoue's Tenure
The FDIC, under Tanoue's leadership, issued an Options
Paper in August 2000, discussing some of the current system's
weaknesses, and proposing a number of solutions.86 In April 2001,
80. DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § IV. Currently state
law requires that most banks collateralize these deposits, which creates reporting
requirements and requires collateral asset management, and associated
administrative expenses. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. Based upon March 31, 2000 data, it is estimated in the Options Paper that
if public deposits became fully insured, insured deposits would increase $113.7
billion, bringing the combined BIF and SAIF reserve ratios from 1.38% to 1.32%. Id.
83. Id.
84. DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § IV. Currently the in-
state public deposit coverage limit is $200,000; the out-of-state limit is $100,000. Id.
Historically, the difference between the coverage for public and private deposits has
been even larger. Id.
85. Id. § I.
86. See id. §§ I-VII (as cited in KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at i).
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the FDIC released an agency report entitled, Keeping the
Promise: Recommendations for Deposit Insurance Reform,
announcing its proposed package of five general reforms and
offering multiple suggestions for how some of these revisions could
be implemented. 7 The proposed reforms, all of which would
require statutory changes, included: (1) merging the BIF and SAIF
funds; (2) amending the statutory restrictions against charging
regular risk-based premiums to all institutions (rather than just to
those that are undercapitalized) regardless of the level of the fund;
(3) changing the way premiums are assessed when the fund(s) fall
below the mandated DRR, thereby eliminating the potential for
sharp premium swings; (4) using rebates to avoid excessive growth
to the insurance fund; and (5) indexing deposit insurance coverage
to maintain its value in real terms. s
While this report has garnered support among many
industry watchers, various parties (legislators, interested
government officials and representatives of banking groups)
disagree with some or all of these recommendations, or that these
recommendations must be implemented as a package deal.
Perhaps one of the most contentious recommendations,
particularly in terms of how it affects consumers, is the issue of
raising the insurance coverage level. Even before the FDIC
released its paper, Tanoue warned [regarding the proposed
increase to the coverage limit] that "we must be mindful of
incentives and the potential for unintended consequences ....
Assuming that some level of deposit insurance is a good
thing,' the FDIC purported that a better way to maintain the real
value of deposit insurance coverage, as opposed to the current
unpredictable, unevenly-timed system of ad hoe Congressional
increases, is through an indexing system."
S7. See Press Release, Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp.,
Opening Statement Announcing the FDIC Preliminary Bank Earnings Rep., Second
Quarter, 2001 (Sept. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Powell, Opening Statement, Sept. 5, 201I,
available at http:Itv,,,wv.fdic.govfnvqnev ;Ispeeeheslarchi%,es!20Olspg5sepOl.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
88. See KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 6.
S9. FDIC Considers Increase in Deposit Insurance Limit, ComI. LENDING
LITIGATION NEWS, Mar. 31, 2000.
90. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
91. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 18.
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Several questions emerge when considering an index
system, including what index to use and the timing of the initial
and subsequent adjustments.9" In Keeping the Promise, the FDIC
proposed using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a practical
index choice because it is widely understood and accepted, quickly
available, and tracks well with the rate of inflation.93 The FDIC
further pointed out that other important government programs
such as Social Security, Medicare, and taxes are indexed, and
argued that consumers would easily understand this indexing
concept. 4
Because changing the level creates burdens for banks and
thrifts, the FDIC recommended soliciting industry input before
deciding on the timing determinants: i.e., the particular percentage
decline required to trigger an increase and a minimum time
interval between each increase.95 The FDIC also maintained that
coverage levels should occur in round numbers and should not be
allowed to decrease, so as to avoid creating uncertainties or
burdening the public with the necessity of monitoring the level to
avoid being underinsured.96 Stating that it views Congress as the
appropriate body to determine the ultimate level of coverage, the
FDIC nevertheless suggested several factors for Congress to
consider as it debates this issue.' These include: the adequacy of
the current level; the moral hazard variable; qualifying municipal
deposits and IRAs for higher coverage; and offering the option of
additional coverage to banks, for an increased fee, in order to
enable them to retain and/or attract large deposits.98
B. FDIC Chairman Donald Powell's Recommendations
Deposit insurance reform advocates initially feared that a
George Bush-appointed FDIC chairman might hinder the reform
efforts initiated by outgoing Chairman Tanoue.99 In his first
92 Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 19.
96. KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at 19.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id. at 20-21.
99. The Bush administration, in its 2003 budget proposal to Congress, announced
it is not considering any proposals to raise the current deposit insurance coverage
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appearance before Congress in his position as FDIC Chairman,
the former Texas community banker,' Donald Powell, endorsed
predecessor Chairman Tanoue's proposals' and relayed his own
thoughts on how he thinks Congress can create a better system. "0
As he addressed the issue of deposit insurance coverage,
Chairman Powell stated that any reforms should attempt to
address and balance: (1) the public's need for protection; (2) small
bank funding needs; (3) the effect of any increase on the deposit
insurance fund; and (4) the moral hazard problem."3 While he did
not support an immediate across-the- board increase in insurance
coverage, he did recommend maintaining the future value of
the coverage through indexingY Chairman Powell suggested
indexing the current $100,000 limit to the CPI beginning January 1,
2005, with subsequent round-number adjustments occurring every
five years." He was willing, however, to support any reasonable,
easy-to-understand indexing system."'
Citing several reasons, Chairman Powell expressed
stronger and more specific recommendations regarding raising
insurance limits for IRA and Keogh (retirement) accounts.""7 He
argued that protecting such accounts was consistent vith existing
government policies encouraging long-tern saving; that the current
$100,000 limit was inadequate for middle-class family retirement
savings; and that encouraging savings in such long-term vehicles
would funnel funds back into the economy facilitating solid,
limit above $100,000. Adam Wasch. Financial Institutions: Bush Rejects Increasing
Deposit Insurance Coverage; Budget Pushes for Less Regulation, Banldng Daily
(BNA), Feb. 5.2002.
100. Donald Powell had been Chairman of the FDIC for almost a week vhen he
gave his opening statement at a press conference on September 5, 2001. See Powvell,
Opening Statement, Sept. 5,2001, supra note 87, at 1.
101. Rob Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform Looking Like Hqh Priority. Am.
BANKER, Dec. 27,2001, at 1.
102. Deposit Insurance Reform: Hearings Before the Subconun. on Financial
Institutions and Conswner Credit, House Conmn. on Financial Services, 107th Cong.
(Oct. 17, 2001) (statement of Donald E. Powell. Chairman of the Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp.) [hereinafter Powell, Statement, Oct. 17, 20011, available at http:1w%,.,wv.fdic.
govlnewslnes:/speecheslarchives2001spl7octOl.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2001).
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3.
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sustainable growth." 8 Chairman Powell suggested dramatically
increasing the coverage level for these accounts to $250,000,119 but
conceded that the FDIC must first research the implications of
such a change and furnish its findings to Congress and the public
before a final decision is made." °
C. Proposed Legislation
Whereas industry representatives have presented a
somewhat united front concerning the need for FDIC reform,
members of Congress have appeared more divided."' However,
the recent Superior Bank failure, which is expected to impact the
SAIF fund severely, raised a warning about the potential exposure
to the deposit insurance system if a banking crisis develops and has
prompted concerns in Congress."'
Currently, "two legislative champions-Senator Tim
Johnson (D-SD) and Representative Spencer Bachus (R-AL)-
are poised to introduce comprehensive legislation" early in 2002."3
After Chairman Powell's testimony on his recommendations for
FDIC reform at the House Financial Services Financial
Institutions Subcommittee meeting, Chairman Bachus indicated to
Chairman Powell that he generally agreed with his views and was
particularly pleased to hear about Chairman Powell's stance on
108. Powell, Statement, Oct. 17,2001, supra note 102, at 3.
109. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101, at 1.
110. Powell, Statement, Oct. 17, 2001, supra note 102, at 3.
111. Rob Blackwell, Sarbanes: Is Warning System Working?, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 3, 2001, at 1, 4.
112. Id.; see also McNamee, supra note 2, at 45. Senate Banking Committee
Chairman, Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) warns that "Superior is 'a timely reminder of the
potential exposure"' to the FDIC funds. Id. As of September 30, 2001, the SAIF had
fallen from 1.44% to 1.39% in three quarters, and during the same period the BIF
dropped from 1.35% to 1.32%. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101,
at 1. After September 11, federal banking regulatory policy-making activity has
focused primarily on regulatory proposals to combat terrorism through controlling
access to international banking services. Richard Cowden, Outlook 2002: Federal
Banking Regulatory Agendas Dominated by USA Patriot Act Rulemaking, BANKING
DAILY (BNA), Jarn. 23, 2002. Though the FDIC deposit insurance reform proposal is
supported by key subcommittee chairs on the House and Senate banking committees,
it must compete with other pressing issues for time on the congressional schedule. Id.
See generally Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights vs. Anti-Money Laundering
Enforcement, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 147 (2002).
113. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101, at 1.
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increasing coverage for retirement accounts."' In February 2002,
Chairman Bachus, in conjunction with Representative Michael
Oxley (R-OH), House Financial Services Committee Chair,
introduced long-anticipated, and comprehensive, reform
legislation which they plan to move through committee and have
ready for presidential signature before the end of the year."' The
bill would, among other things, increase the coverage limit from
$100,000 to $130,000, provide for inflation indexing every ten
years, raise retirement account coverage to $260,000, and "insure
in-state municipal deposits up to the total equity capital of the
insured institution."'1 16
In the Senate, the June 2001 defection of Vermont Senator
James Jefford from the Republican party set in motion a change in
leadership, both in the Senate and in its Banking Committee,
which should favor continued discussion on the topic of deposit
insurance reform and increasing insurance coverage.'" 7 Senator
Johnson, who is the third-ranking Democrat on the Senate
Banking Committee and new chairman of the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions, introduced in January 2001 an amending bill
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to require periodic (every
three years) cost of living adjustments to the maximum amount of
deposit insurance coverage."' This bill tracked the ICBA's
recommendations on indexing deposit insurance."" Senator
114. Rob Blackwell, FDIC Chiefs IRA. Preinium Ideas Find House Support, A%1.
BANKER, Oct. 18, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Blackwell, FDIC Chiefs IRA, Prcmium
Ideas].
115. Adam Wasch, Financial Institutions: Rep. Bachts Introduces Deposit
Insurance Reform Bill, Banking Daily (BNA), Feb. 13,2002. See also Adam Wasch,
Deposit Insurance: Oxley, Bachus Push for Higher Deposit Insurance Coverage
Limits, Banking Daily (BNA), Feb. 8, 2002.
116. 1l
117. See Steve Cocheo, Quick Take on the Senate Turnover. A.B.A. BmNKING J.,
July 2001, at 6. Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) replaced Senator Phil Gramm (R-
TX) as Chair of the Senate Banking Committee. Id. Senator Gramm vas extremely
opposed to deposit insurance reform and did not plan to address it in committee, thus
hearings on this topic, which would likely not have occurred soon or at all under
Senator Gramm's leadership, may now take place. Id.
118. See S. 128, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 20tJl) (cited as Meeting America's
Investment Needs in Small Tovs Act of 2001).
119. Richard Cowden, Powell Backs Deposit Insurance Reform as Proposed in
April by Predecessor Tanoue, 77 BANKING REP. (BNA) 355, Sept. 10, 2001
[hereinafter Cowden, Powell Backs Deposit Insurance Reform].
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Johnson plans to draft a 2002 bill, similar to the Bachus bill, so that
the Senate legislature tracks with the House efforts. 2 '
A number of earlier bills that addressed some of the
deposit insurance coverage issues raised by the FDIC had also
been introduced in both the House and Senate in 2001.21
Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO) introduced a bill similar to the
Johnson bill in June 2001 that provided for cost of living
adjustments every three years beginning January 1, 2002.122
Senator Robert Toricelli (D-NJ), in January 2001,
introduced a bill (similar to a provision in the Bachus bill)
increasing deposit insurance coverage for in-state municipal
depositors up to the total amount of the deposit.12 1 In May 2001,
Representative Paul Gillmor (R-OH) sponsored a similar House
bill."'
124
V. EVALUATION OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
COVERAGE PROPOSALS
A. Positions of Regulators and Other Government Entities
Federal government representatives have conflicting views
regarding increasing and/or indexing deposit insurance coverage at
this time. Donald Powell, Chairman of FDIC, and Ellen Seidman,
former Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS)/Treasury, endorse indexation; Alan Greenspan, Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) and Sheila Bair, the
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions at the Treasury
Department, oppose any indexing.25 John Hawke, Comptroller of
the Currency, recently stated he had "no objection" to indexing, 26
120. Adam Wasch, Deposit Insurance: Rep. Bachus, Sen. Johnson Prepare Broad
Deposit Insurance Reform Proposals, Banking Daily (BNA), Jan. 25,2002.
121. Representative Oxley reported holding three hearings on deposit insurance
reform in 2001. Id.
122. See H.R. 746, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (cited as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Adjustment Act).
123. See S. 227, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (cited as the Municipal Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 2001).
124. See H.R. 1899, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (cited as the Municipal Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 2001).
125. Rob Blackwell, In Brief. Comptroller Endorses Insurance Indexing, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 26,2001, at 5.
126. Id.
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leading some to believe there is groving support among federal
regulators for FDIC reform."
Representatives of the Fed and some representatives from
the Treasury Department disagree with both the aim and method
of insurance coverage reform and oppose raising the coverage
level because they believe it would weaken market discipline and
encourage more risk-taking by banking institutions.' They are
also among those who believe in maintaining the coverage ceiling
at this time, testifying that depositors, especially large wealthy
ones, should be held accountable for scrutinizing their financial
institutions for soundness t' 9 rather than depending solely on
deposit insurance to keep their savings safe. Refuting this view,
Kenneth Guenther, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
ICBA, questioned how an ordinary depositor could be expected to
effectively monitor banks when the OTS was unable to predict the
recent failure of $2.3 billion asset Superior Bank.'2
The Fed and various Treasury representatives are likely, as
well, to continue their opposition to an index system to maintain
the real value of the coverage limit because of their belief that
raising coverage would dramatically increase the federal safety net
and undermine market discipline. 3' In addition, it is anticipated
that they vll oppose Chairman Powell's proposal to increase the
coverage level for retirement accounts to $250,00.2
Speaking before a subcommittee of the House Financial
Services Committee, Fed Governor Laurence Meyer supported all
the FDIC reform proposals except for the increase to deposit
insurance coverage.1 '  Although small banks argued that the
increase would enable them to compete with larger institutions
offering multiple insured accounts through affiliated entities,
Governor Meyer countered this argument, claiming that "raising
127. Id. (citing Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD)).
128. Rob Blackwell, What Price Is Too High fJ.r Reform?, AM-I. BA'3-ER, Aug. 6,
2001, at 1, 4.
129. Rob Blackwell, Superior's Uninsured $66,M: Fuel for Reform, AM. BA i-:En,
Aug. 14, 2001, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Blackwell, Superior's Uninsured S0M]. See also
BlackweU, What Price Is Too High, supra note 12,1, at 1, 4.
130. Black-well, Superior's Uninsured S66M, supra note 129, at 1, 5.
131. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101, at 1. Some large banls
join the Fed and Treasury Dept. in this iew. Id.
132. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101, at 1.
133. Fed qffers Broad Support, supra note 57.
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the coverage limit of each account would also increase the amount
large multibank organizations would be able to offer, preserving
the competitive disparity."'134 Governor Meyer also reiterated that
deposit insurance creates a moral hazard issue-inducing banks to
take excessive risks at the expense of the insurer (the FDIC)
because insured depositors are no longer concerned about banks'
risky conduct.'35 Governor Meyer further warned that when
contemplating deposit insurance reforms, it is necessary to
consider the inherent tradeoffs between the benefit of providing
market stability and protection to the small investor, and the cost
of the reduction of market discipline. 36
Chairman Greenspan, has also stated his opposition to
increasing the deposit insurance coverage limit because it would
undermine depositor discipline.'37  FDIC Chairman Powell,
however, disputed the arguments made by Chairman Greenspan
and other critics that indexing the insurance coverage limit would
undermine depositor discipline by increasing the federal safety
net.138 Instead, Chairman Powell claimed the FDIC was not
recommending an increase to the safety net, but simply
recommending that it not be decreased due to inflation. 139
Industry observers and participants had not seen FDIC
reform as a high priority for the current administration as there
has been only moderate pressure from the industry to push
through changes. 4 ' The administration's current propensity may
become even more pronounced due to its recent focus on national
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See AM. BANKERS Assoc., ABA TALKING POINTS ON DEPOSIT INSURANCE
REFORM (Mar. 8, 2001) (citing Chairman Greenspan's stated opposition to
enacting a $200,000 limit), available at http://www.aba.comllndustry+Issues/
DITalkingPoints.html (last visited Feb 28, 2002); see also Blackwell, FDIC Chief's
IRA, Premium Ideas, supra note 114, at 1 (citing Chairman Powell's reference to
Chairman Greenspan's objection to indexing the deposit insurance limit). Chairman
Greenspan refers to deposit insurance and other federal programs intended to keep
banks safe as the "safety net." Greenspan Cautions on F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2001, at C14. He cautions that any changes to this safety net must be balanced
against potential costs. Id.
138. Blackwell, FDIC Chief's IRA, Premium Ideas, supra note 114, at 1.
139. Powell, Statement, Oct. 17,2001, supra note 102, at 3.
140. Michele Heller, A Read (Finally) on Treasury's Policy Plan, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 22, 2001, at 1, 4 (citing Edward L. Yingling, chief lobbyist for the ABA)
[hereinafter Heller, A Read (Finally)].
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security and combating international terrorism. Additionally, both
the Fed and Treasury argue that depositors are not asking for an
increase and do not believe that lost deposits due to coverage
limits are the cause of the funding shortage in community banks. 4
Regarding the issue of depositor demands, the government's
position on increasing deposit insurance is interesting, especially in
view of the results of a recent Gallup survey poll indicating deposit
insurance was important to the majority of respondents when
making decisions on where to invest. 4 2 With the aging of baby
boomers, and in our present national climate, touched by fear of
war and terrorism as well as uncertainty about the economy, one
can surmise from the results of this survey that consumers will
increasingly favor financial safety and increased insurance
coverage for their deposits. Kenneth Guenther (ICBA President)
has also indicated that the "AARP generation" has become much
more interested in increased depositor coverage since the decline
of the stock market.43
In an appendix to recent testimony before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman
Greenspan reported that community banks have successfully
maintained their core deposit bases, although the percentage of
their assets funded by core deposits has dropped moderately in the
141. Blackwell, Treasury Joins Fed, supra note 42, at 1, 3. Contra ICBA SPECIAL
REP., supra note 70, at 15. In it's fall 2000 special report on Federal Deposit
Insurance, the ICBA (Independent Community Bankers of America) cited small
banks' difficulty attracting and maintaining their deposit base-historically their
primary funding source-which is needed to keep pace with strong loan demand
against the backdrop of a strong economy and more attractiv e alternative investment
vehicles. Id.
142. The poll, questioning individual consumers who make household financial
decisions, showed that while more respondents cited risk and return as factors in
deciding where to invest family money, fifty-seven percent of them considered
deposit insurance "very important" when determining w'here to invest. See FDIC
Insurance Big Factor, supra note 51. The majority of respondents also would
reportedly move some deposits into bank insured accounts if levels were raised, and
predicted they would be more likely to move their money to insured deposits as they
neared retirement, or in response to a stock market crash or recession. Id.
143. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101, at 1. AARP, formerly
known as the American Association of Retired Persons, is a non-partisan
organization for individuals fifty years of age and older with over thirty-four million
members. AARP, WHAT Is AARP?, at http:flaarp.orghvhat js.html (last visited Jan.
18, 2002). It focuses on enhancing the lives of its members in four areas (health and
wellness; economic security and work; long term care and independent living; and
personal enrichment) through, among other things, advocacy and education. Id.
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past ten years from eighty percent to seventy-three percent for
banks with less than fifty million dollars in assets. 4 Rapid loan
growth, however, combined with this moderate drop in the
percentage of assets funded by core deposits, has put pressures on
community banks to seek funding elsewhere.'45 The Fed expressed
concern that the variety, complexity, volatility and volume of these
non-traditional funding sources create new issues, prompting it to
provide guidance highlighting the importance of adequate bank
management techniques for ensuring stable and consistent
funding."'
In August 2001, Sheila Bair, the Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions at the Treasury Department, and the first
Bush administration official to speak at length about deposit
insurance, testified on behalf of the Treasury Department before
the House Financial Services Subcommittee. She strongly
endorsed many of the FDIC recommendations but opposed
deposit insurance coverage increases and indexing, 47 claiming the
Treasury did not find the current limit on deposit insurance
burdensome to consumers.1
48
Former OTS Director Ellen Seidman, in an address to the
House Financial Institutions Subcommittee, encouraged Congress
to build on the FDIC reform proposal. 149 She stated that before
raising or indexing the deposit insurance coverage limit, the
implementation of a real risk-based pricing system was necessary
because the negative effects of inappropriate insurance pricing are
magnified as the ceiling increases.15 She also pointed out that
144. Greenspan, Condition of the Banking Industry, supra note 45, at 5.
145. Id. Community banks are responding to this challenge by turning to jumbo
deposits and Federal Home Loan Bank advances, and by liquidating securities
holdings and raising their loan-to-deposit ratios to peak levels. Id.
146. Id. at 5-6.
147. Heller, A Read (Finally), supra note 140, at 1, 5. See also Cowden, Quarterly
Bank Earnings Remain Strong, supra note 47, at 355.
148. Cowden, Powell Backs Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note 119, at 355
(citing 77 BBR 173, July 30,2001).
149. OTS Stakes Out Position on Deposit Insurance Reform, BANK BAILOUT
LITIGATION NEWS, Sept. 17, 2001 [hereinafter OTS Stakes Out Position]. Seidman
also supported reforming the misallocation of insurance fund resources concerning
bank and thrift regulatory supervision. Id.
150. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, House Comm. on Financial Services,
107th Cong. 9 (July 26, 2001) (testimony by Ellen Seidman, Dir. of the Off. of Thrift
Supervision) [hereinafter Seidman, Testimony, July 26, 2001], http://www.ots.treas.
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choosing the right level is especially important with indexing, as
opposed to ad hoe increases, because it would lock in the level
over time. 5' While Seidman endorses indexation, 5  she
nevertheless cautions that the FDIC reform components are highly
interrelated and supports changing coverage levels only in "the
context of comprehensive reform."'
5 3
B. Banks' Positions-Funding Concerns
Efforts to revise deposit insurance may ultimately depend
on whether bankers with different perspectives and objectives can
come to agreement on a number of technical issues.' Most banks
generally oppose any unilateral increase in premiums, and thus
fear that an increase in deposit coverage will necessarily entail
some type of funding mechanism to maintain the DRR level. 5 '
Other banks, especially small community banks, are more willing
to assume some small increase if it will mean increased deposits.
The American Bankers Association (ABA) is the largest
banking trade organization in the country, representing banks of
all sizes and categories from community and regional to money
center banks and holding companies. 17 In 2000 it commissioned
an independent study to measure the impact of raising the deposit
insurance level to $200,0002 "  Professor Mark Flannery, the
gov/docsfS708S.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
15L Id. at 9-10.
152. See Blackwell, In Brief, supra note 125. at 5.
153. OTS Stakes Out Position, supra note 149.
154. McNamee, supra note 2, at 45.
155. See Press Release, Deposit Insurance Reform, Hcaringy Before the Subeomm.
on FianciaL Institutions. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs (Aug. 2, 2001) (testimony of Jeff L. Plagge on be2half of the ABA)
[hereinafter Plagge, Testimony Aug. 2, 2001] at httpII'x.v:,.aba.conIPres+Rcom
testimony0S020l.html (last visited Feb. 14,2002).
156. Press Release, Don Mengedoth, Deposit Insurance Reform, Memo to All
Banking Inst. from ABA President (Mar. 9, 2001) at http:1/vw.aba.comPress
RoomiDepositinsuranceMemoFollowup.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). See
generally Plagge, Testimony, Aug. 2. 2001. The ICBA argues that an increase in
coverage may not increase the FDIC's or the tax'payer's exposure, which Vill b
dependent on depositor behavior. ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 70, at 5.
157. Plagge, Testimony, Aug. 2,2001, supra note 155.
158. Press Release, Don Mengedoth, Study on Benefits and Costs of S200Z
Deposit Ins. Coverage, Memo to Member Banks and SavinD Inst. CEO3
from ABA President (Jan. 3, 2001), at http:/Ivw'.v.aba.comiPress+Roomf
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Banking Chair at the University of Florida, conducted this study,
and his research and modeling enabled him to predict both the
expected benefits and costs to the industry.' 9 His projections
included a combined rise in insured deposit balances of $128 to
$422 billion, driving the insurance fund's reserve ratio to between
1.11% to 1.21%, which would necessitate renewed premium
assessments for all covered institutions.' 6
The ABA had previously urged an upward adjustment to
the insurance limit to take into account inflationary devaluation,
and also recommended permanently indexing the fund to ease
depositors' fears about protection erosion. 16' However, after
reviewing responses to ABA President Don Mengedoth's letter to
its members soliciting feedback on the proposed coverage
increase, the organization recognizes splits in member opinions on
this issue. 62  Some members, primarily community bank
executives, feel $200,000 coverage is essential to attracting deposits
and are willing to absorb additional cost, while other community
bankers disagree that increased coverage would result in a transfer
of funds from higher-yield, uninsured accounts from other
Depositlnsurancememo.htm (last visited Feb. 14,2002).
159. Mark J. Flannery, Ph.D., Increasing Deposit Insurance Coverage: Implications
for the Federal Insurance Funds and for Bank Deposit Balances, prepared for the
American Bankers Association, Dec. 2000, at http://www.aba.comNR/rdonlyres/
00002ea2panhegmuokjcjryn/mjfrep9999996.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). The study
hypothesized that raising the insurance limit would raise insured deposit balances in
two ways: (1) by raising the insurable portion of balances already in place; and (2) by
helping bankers attract new funds into the industry. Id. at ii. Doubling the insurance
coverage on existing bank balances (as of June 30, 2000) would have increased the
total insured balances approximately 8.33% ($246 billion) higher than they were
under the $100,000 limit, without even experiencing an increase in the actual deposits
and would subsequently reduce the combined BIF and SAIF reserve ratio from
1.36% to 1.26%. Id. Flannery stated that projecting the amount of additional bank
deposits resulting from the increased coverage level was more difficult because it
necessarily involves estimations. Id. at 18. He based his estimates on customer
attitudes towards deposit insurance, gathered through ABA-sponsored telephone
surveys to high net worth individual and small business owner customers, and roughly
predicted a four to thirteen percent increase over current domestic deposits. Id. at ii-
iii.
160. Id. at iii-iv.
161. See ABA Urges Insurance Deposit Reform, BANK BAILOUT LITIGATION
NEWS, July 17, 2000 (citing comments by James E. Smith, First Vice President of
ABA); see also FDIC Releases 'Options Paper' on Deposit Insurance Reform, BANK
BAILOUT LITIGATION NEWS, Sept. 12, 2000 (citing comments by Edward Yingling,
Executive Director of ABA Government Relations).
162. Mengedoth, Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note 156.
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institutions.163 Still others suggest more research is needed,
including a more detailed look at the effects of the 1980 increase."
The ABA, as an organization, has strong reservations
about increasing insurance premium costs to its member banks,
and generally opposes any deposit insurance legislation that
imposes significant new insurance costs."bS It has consistently
opposed legislative reforms that would result in an increase in
premiums when the insurance funds are above the statutory 1.25%
DRR.'66 It argues strongly for continuance of the zero-premium
system 67 for top-rated banks, except those which are grovng
faster than the norm, claiming that the current forty-two billion
dollars in FDIC funds are a result of significant previous sacrifice
on the part of banks and savings institutions.' The ABA also
argues that the zero-premium system provides incentives for banks
to be in the top category, and that new premiums, translating into
additional expenses for the banks, would result in lost lending
opportunities. 69
With its diverse constituency, the ABA also admits, that
the current $100,000 limit has lost over half of its real value since
1980, making it especially difficult for smaller community banks to
attract sufficient deposits to fund local mortgage loan demand.'
After Professor Flannery's study pointed out the potential cost
associated with the proposed increase to $200,000, some bankers
expressed concerns over raising the coverage limit, especially
regarding the loss of the current insurance fund buffer and the
potential for premium increases.' The ABA, accordingly, has
somewhat vacillated from its official position, stating that the
163. Id.
164. IU.
165. Testimony of James E. Smith, May 16, 2001,supra note 39, at 3.
166. Blackwell, What Price Is Too High, supra note 128, at 1. 4.
167. Press Release, Don Mengedoth, Letter from ABA President to Members of
the House Financial Services Comm. Regarding Deposit Ins. Reform (Aug. 17, 2001)
[hereinafter Mengedoth, Aug. 17. 2001 Letter] at httpPlVwww.aba.con
Press+Room/housefinsvcltr_081701.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). The present
funding level in the deposit insurance funds (over forty-two billion dollars) is so large
that the funds are currently self-insured, requiring no premium payments from top-
rated institutions. Id.
168. In BrieF ABA: Banks Get No Free Ride, AM. BANKER, Aug. 23.2001, at 5.
169. Mengedoth, Aug. 17,2001 Letter, supra note 167.
170. Testimony of James E. Smith. May 16.2001, supra note 39, at 4.
171. Id. at 6.
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current limit should be increased "to the maximum possible
without incurring significant costs that would outweigh the value
of the increase." 
172
The ICBA appears to view the proposed increase in
deposit insurance coverage levels as one of the key items in the
FDIC's five-part reform proposal. In a thirty-page special report
on federal deposit insurance, the ICBA unequivocally argues that
an adequate deposit insurance level is critical to the viability of the
community bank system because of its link to attracting core
deposits to support community lending-typically mortgages and
small business loans. 173  The ICBA minimizes the potential
exposure to the FDIC or the taxpayer resulting from an increase in
coverage levels, citing former FDIC Chairman Tanoue's words at
the March 2000 ICBA convention. 74 At that time she expressed
the FDIC's belief that "'raising the coverage limit to $200,000 may
not substantially elevate the risk exposure because depositors
already have the ability to structure their accounts to achieve far
greater coverage' over $100,000.171 The ICBA favors indexing
from the current $100,000 level, which would raise coverage to
approximately $200,000 for each insured account. 76
A third trade organization, America's Community Bankers
(ACB), which represents the nation's community banks of all
charter types and sizes, has also been a leading advocate of deposit
insurance reform. However, in contrast to the ICBA, its prime
emphasis on reform appears to be focused more on resolving the
free-rider problem than on insurance coverage limits. 77 The ACB
172 Id.
173. ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 70, at 4.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id.
176. Cowden, Quarterly Bank Earnings Remain Strong, supra note 47, at 355-56.
177. In an August, 2001 press release, the organization prompted Congress to
resolve deposit insurance issues, "especially the free-rider problem," and urged
passage of H.R. 1293 (the proposed Deposit Insurance Stabilization Act) which
would allow the FDIC to impose a fee on insured depository institutions
experiencing a to-be-determined net increase in new insured deposits, merge the BIF
and SAIF, and give the FDIC flexibility to recapitalize the funds without charging the
mandatory 23 basis-point premium. See generally Press Release, ACB Calls for
Passage of Legislation to Strengthen Deposit Insurance Funds (Aug. 2, 2001)
[hereinafter ACB Calls for Passage], at http://www.acbankers.org/newsbank/
scripts/press-view.asp?prlD=326 (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). See also H.R. 1293,
107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
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supports modestly indexing insurance coverage from 1974, which
would currently bring the limit to approximately $135,000. T3
Diane Casey, ACB's President, relayed that member banks have
extremely serious objections to paying premiums, and expressed
the fear that new insurance costs could be a "deal ldler."'"
C. Banks' Positions-Retirement Accounts
The ABA suggests that long-term savings vehicles such as
IRAs, Keoghs, and potentially, private social security accounts
should perhaps be treated differently than other deposits in terms
of insurance coverage limits for several reasons." These
investment deposits tend to: be long-term; grow considerably over
time; and represent an important source of stable funding for
banks."$l In addition, since these deposits are designated as
retirement funds, consumers may seek safety and security in these
vehicles, thus making deposit insurance especially appealing. 2
There is also precedence for higher insurance coverage for
retirement accounts; the 1978 Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act provided coverage of $100,000-
two and one half times the standard $40,000 limit in place at that
time.18
3
In contrast to its modest support of indexing for insurance
coverage in general, ACB strongly promotes increased insurance
protection on retirement accounts, claiming that $100,000 is no
longer adequate."4  FDIC statistics indicate that retirement
deposits in insured institutions rose from $216 billion in 1999 to
$221 billion in 2000, while retirement savings in mutual funds
178. ACB Calls for Passage, supra note 177.
179. Blackwell, What Price Is Too High, supra note 128, at 1, 4.
180. Testimony of James E. Smith, May 16, 2001, supra note 39, at 6-7.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 7. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1401(3), 92 Stat. 3721 (1978).
184. Press Release, U.S. Banldng Executive Calls for Increase in Deposit Ins.
Coverage of Retirement Accounts (Sept. 13, 2001) at http-iiUwwv.acbankers.orgf
nevwsbanklscriptspressyiew.asp?prID=330 (last visited Feb. 14, 2092). In a
September 2001 address to the 12' Special Seminar on International Finance, Mr.
Bochnowsld remarked that $100,000 coverage for retirement accounts was
insufficient, and that "our government must increase deposit insurance coverage for
retirement savings accounts, and it needs to do so now." Id.
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declined.'85  Accordingly, David Bochnowski, ACB's Chair,
maintains that banks are the first choice safe haven for retirement
savings and argues that government policy must reflect that
choice. 8 6 He also points out that retirement savings accounts
historically were insured at twice the coverage of non-retirement
accounts and argues that we need to reclaim that insurance
differential.8 7
VI. CONCLUSION
At first blush, increased deposit insurance coverage
appears to be advantageous for everyone. Depositors favor an
increase because it will add insurance protection to a greater share
of their savings, thus relieving them from worrying about bank
stability and the safety of their money.' Banks, especially
community banks, like it because it helps them compete for
deposit dollars, which they can then use as an inexpensive source
to fund income-producing loans.'89 Legislators support deposit
insurance because it bolsters the public's confidence in the banking
system and stabilizes the economy, an especially relevant factor if
the nation begins to experience a large number of bank failures
and subsequent panic by the saving public.9 ' Depositors of funds
in covered institutions within the insurable limit have never lost a
penny as the result of a bank or thrift failure since Congress
instituted deposit insurance and the FDIC.' 9'
However, these benefits do not come without a cost.
Deposit insurance requires a balancing of public policy objectives
such as safety for savers and a stable banking system against
concomitant risks and expenses. 92 "Proposals for reforming
deposit insurance are generally based on the view that the present
balance between the terms of the trade-off is inappropriate."'193
185. Id. (citing Bochnowski).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Bradley, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
189. See ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 173 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 14-16 and note 52, and accompanying text.
191. DEPOSIT INSURANCE OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, § IV.
192. Hanc, supra note 1, at 20.
193. Id. at 21.
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Hence, to get more insurance coverage, someone has to pay
something for it.
Most covered banks have already paid dearly to build up
the BIF and SAIF insurance funds to their present level and
understandably do not want to be charged premiums while the
pool is fully funded,194 especially if they are managing their asset
risks responsibly. Instead, banks experiencing normal growth
strongly advocate charging premiums to fast growing institutions
to address inherent unfairness in the current system, rather than
across the board increases for all institutions."5 Required
premiums paid to, and held by, the government are dollars that
banks cannot lend out in the community. This decrease in
available funds to lend could impact the economy's rate of
recovery. Deposit insurance creates moral hazard, and a strong
argument also exists for the premise that the more their deposits
are insured, the more banks will have incentives to take risks,
which usually come in the form of lower quality loans."'
It appears that in order to determine the correct insurance
coverage level, the American public needs to decide its prime
objectives in maintaining or increasing it. In addition to the
previously mentioned benefits, deposit insurance helps to preserve
the unit banking system, a system made up of a large number of
independently owned banks and thrifts, as opposed to a branch
banking system with consolidated ownership. 1" Small banks have
difficulties gaining access to inexpensive funding for loans; thus,
deposit insurance, which helps them attract core deposits, allows
them to stay in business within the small communities they
serve t9s Their presence in these often rural communities assists in
maintaining the viability of the town by providing affordable loans
for mortgages, farms and small businesses.
In an era where employees are less dependent on social
security and company-funded pension plans to fund their
194. See Mengedoth, Letter, Aug. 17, supra note 167, at 1.
195. Testimony of James E. Smith, May 16, 2001 supra note 39, at 8; see also
Plagge, Testimony, Aug. 2,2001, supra note 155 (stating that addressing the "inherent
unfairness in the current system that allov-s fast growing institutions to pay no
premiums, even though their grovAh materially dilutes the coverage reserve ratio of
the insurance funds" is the top reform priority for some bankers).
196. See Fed Offers Broad Support, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
197. See Hanc, supra note 1; supra note 19 and accompanying text.
198. See generally ICBA SPECIAL REP., supra note 70, at 18-19.
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retirement, 99  deposit insurance provides security and
encouragement for individual, risk-free saving for retirement.
Many legislators, who are subject to political accountability,
appear to use this public policy rationale when arguing for
increased deposit insurance limits. As the earliest baby-boomers
are approaching retirement age, voters may demand higher
insurance coverage despite the tradeoffs. Reform supporters have
also courted the AARP to back the idea of increased coverage for
individual retirement accounts, and if this were to occur it would
add extensive political clout to the position.00 Young adult
investors who, due to the current economic downturn, are
experiencing for the first time a serious drop in the value of their
investment portfolios, may also increasingly turn to safer
investments, thus exerting additional political pressure for
increased levels of deposit insurance.
Although not covered extensively in this Note, many of the
moral hazard issues associated with increasing deposit insurance
coverage levels will be tackled more fully and effectively in other
FDIC reform provisions that directly address risk-based premium
issues and methods for premium assessments and rebates.20 ' This
intertwining of issues regarding deposit insurance reform strongly
supports the "package approach" to reforms promoted by the
FDIC. Although the 1980 increase is cited as a contributing factor
in the ensuing savings and loan crisis, the system then did not have
the current risk-based pricing or prompt-corrective action capital
rules.02 However, the unintended consequences2 3 of the last
increase should serve as a warning about the hazards of
implementing a piecemeal, versus package, reform.
Modifying the deposit insurance system requires statutory
revisions." Thus, if and how the system will change in the near
future depends on whether legislators and their constituents see
this as an important topic. Domestic issues will most probably
take a back seat to national security and foreign policy issues over
199. Id. at 18-19.
200. Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Reform, supra note 101, at 1.
201. See KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, at i-ii.
202. Seidman, Testimony, July 26, 2001, supra note 150, at 4.
203. Id.
204. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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the following year,"05 and legislators may decide to follow the old
maxim, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." However, the state of the
economy may ultimately determine whether reforming legislation
is enacted. As Senator Johnson stated at the end of 2001, '[tlhe
time to reform the system is now, before we dip further into
recession." 20 6
NANCY J. COPPOLA
205. "[Deposit] reform legislation seemed doomed after September 11, like other
issues unrelated to national security." Blackwell, Near-Dead FDIC Refonn, supra
note 101, at 1.
206. Id.
46120021
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